Re-encryption Mix Nets are used to provide anonymity by passing encrypted messages through a collection of servers which each permute and re-encrypt messages. They are used in secure electronic voting protocols because they provide a combination of anonymity and verifiability. The use of several peers also provides for robustness, since a Mix Net can run even in the presence of a minority of dishonest or incorrectly behaving peers. However, in practice the protocols for peers to decide when to exclude a peer are complex distributed algorithms, and it is non-trivial to gain confidence that the Mix Net will be robust and live in the presence of faulty or malicious peers. In this paper we model and analyse the algorithm used by Ximix, a particular Mix Net implementation, using the CSP process algebra and the FDR model checker. We model and analyse the protocol in the presence of a realistic intruder based on Roscoe and Goldsmith's perfect Spy [1]. We show that in the current implementation the protocol does not satisfy the robustness requirement. Finally, we propose a method of making it robust, and verify in FDR that the proposed solution is sound and provides this robustness. Along the way, we highlight the omissions and deviations from the original RPC proposal; Mix Net protocols are extremely fragile, and small and seemingly benign changes may result in security flaws. Our experimental results show that, with our modification, Ximix guarantees termination and produces a correct output in the presence of an intruder who can corrupt a minority of mix servers.
Introduction
Since ancient times, elections have been the most important aspect in ensuring democracy. A voting system should provide voters with the assurance that her vote has been cast as intended and included in the tally without being modified, whilst guaranteeing the secrecy of the vote. Recent proposals for secure electronic voting aim to provide end-to-end verifiability using cryptographic techniques, and can use anonymising Mix Nets to provide secrecy of the ballot (by anonymising which voter has cast any particular vote) while also providing the assurance that the votes have been decrypted correctly. The upcoming elections in the State of Victoria, Australia, will be the world's first large-scale political elections where a verifiable electronic voting system will be used. A key component in achieving this is the Mix Net and, of course, this should be robust and produce its required output. However, this key liveness property is generally not analysed in the literature, and it is one that the Victorian system's Mix Net (Ximix) is required to provide.
A Mix Net is a cryptographic protocol, which unlinks the correspondence between its input vector of encrypted values and the permuted vector of decrypted values given as output, thus providing anonymity to the communicating entities. The first Mix Net was introduced by Chaum [2] for constructing anonymous mail systems. In its general construction, a Mix Net consists of a sequence of servers M 1 . . . M n , also called mix servers, that collectively execute a protocol. Based on the way the mix servers operate on the input ciphertexts, Mix Nets are classified as decryption and re-encryption Mix Nets. However, most of those proposed in the literature fall into the second category. We briefly explain how a re-encryption Mix Net works; for more details about decryption and re-encryption Mix Nets, we refer the reader to [2, 3] .
The first re-encryption Mix Net was introduced by Park et. al [4] . In this type of Mix Net, a joint public-key is generated by combining the public-keys of the mix servers. The inputs are encrypted under the joint public-key and then submitted to the Mix Net. Each mix server, in turn, re-encrypts its inputs, shuffles them using its own secret permutation and fresh randomnesses and then posts them onto a publicly accessible Web Bulletin Board (WBB). Once all the mix servers have finished their mixing, the decryption phase starts, where the final list of ciphertexts is decrypted in a distributed manner to achieve robustness and then posted on the WBB for public verification. To ensure correctness of the execution, each mix server produces a zero-knowledge proof, which is posted on the WBB alongside the mixed and decrypted messages.
Owing to their importance in providing anonymity to the communicating parties, Mix Nets play a significant role in building systems where security requirements, such as privacy, should hold. Their main application is in electronicvoting [5-8], but they have been also used in other real-life applications, such as: electronic cash payments, RFID tags and anonymous Web browsing. In electronic voting schemes, Mix Nets are used to ensure that no one can track and reveal a voter's vote, thereby guaranteeing the privacy of the vote and the anonymity of the voter. However, this is not always enough; a well constructed Mix Net should fulfill a number of security and safety requirements, such as robustness, correctness and public verifiability. A Mix Net is called robust if it terminates and produces a proof of the correctness of the operation in the presence of (a limited number of) faulty or malicious mix servers. Correctness guarantees that the output is, indeed, a valid permutation of the input ciphertexts. Additionally, it is crucial for misbehaviour to be detectable by anyone who is interested in checking the correctness of the execution, a property called public verifiability.
